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Abstract
The introduction of Static Data Authentication (SDA) compliant
EMV cards with their improved cardholder verification and card au-
thentication capabilities has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
levels of fraud seen at Point of Sale (POS) terminals. However, with
this POS-based reduction has come a corresponding increase in the
level of fraud associated with Internet-based Card Not Present (CNP)
transactions. This increase is largely attributable to the fact that
Internet-based CNP processing has no easy way of integrating EMV
into its transaction architecture. In this regard, payment is reliant on
Mail Order Telephone Order (MOTO) based processing where knowl-
edge of card account details is deemed a sufficient form of transaction
authorisation.
This report aims to demonstrate how Trusted Computing tech-
nology can be used to emulate EMV for use in Internet-based CNP
transactions. Through a combination of a Trusted Platform Module,
processer (with chipset extensions) and OS support we show how we
can replicate the functionality of standard EMV-compliant cards. The
usage of Trusted Computing in this setting allows a direct migration
to more powerful Combined DDA and application cryptogram gener-
ation (CDA) cards as well as offering increased security benefits over
those seen in EMV’s deployment for POS transactions. Customer
to Merchant interaction in our setting mirrors transaction processing
at traditional POS terminals. We build upon the services offered by
Trusted Computing in order to provide a secure and extensible archi-
tecture for Internet-based CNP transactions.
1 Introduction
Over the past ten to fifteen years the Internet has been transformed from a
research-oriented tool into a global platform for electronic commerce. With
this transformation, the use of one particular method of Internet-based pay-
ment has emerged as the predominant means through which on-line goods
are purchased. This particular form of payment, typically referred to as Card
Not Present1 (CNP) transactions, uses the account information embossed on
physical (debit/credit) payment cards to purchase items on-line. Unfortu-
nately, CNP transactions whilst ubiquitous, are currently far from secure.
A recent report by the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS)
on card fraud [4] showed that Internet-based CNP transactions and their as-
1For the remainder of this paper all references to CNP transactions refer to Internet-
based CNP transactions.
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sociated chargebacks2 accounted for nearly 27% of all card fraud perpetrated
in 2005 in the UK. This translated into £117 million in losses for card issuers
and merchants.
This proliferation of Internet-based commerce (and the increasing level
of fraud associated with it) has resulted in a great deal of effort in develop-
ing protocols for securing CNP transactions. However, very few of of these
protocols have enjoyed any quantifiable success. Although some innovative
schemes such as Paypal have enjoyed some success (largely due to a tie in
with eBay), the vast majority of Internet-based CNP payments use a single
protocol suite, namely SSL, to secure card account information in transit.
Unfortunately, this usage of SSL is not a panacea for enabling secure
CNP transactions. SSL was not designed as a payment protocol but instead
adopted as a de facto standard for securing CNP transactions. Indeed, the
use of SSL in CNP transactions has a number of short-comings. These ‘flaws’
in SSL can largely be attributed to the marriage of convenience that exists
with current CNP-based card processing and are not necessarily intrinsic to
the protocol itself. In securing CNP transactions, SSL is used only in relation
to securing the payment channel over which customer card account details are
sent, everything else remains outside of SSL’s protection remit. This poses
two fundamental problems for a CNP payment architecture. Firstly, from the
merchant’s perspective: there is no guarantee that the customer owns the ac-
count number being proffered in a particular payment transaction. Secondly,
from the customer’s perspective: there is little, if any, assurance that the
merchant will endeavour to protect sensitive cardholder data stored on their
servers. In this regard, transaction processing is reliant on a Mail Order Tele-
phone Order (MOTO) based system whereby demonstrating knowledge of a
card’s Personal Account Number (PAN) and corresponding Card Security
Code (CSC) are deemed a sufficient form of transaction authorisation.
The real world roll-out of EMV and the accompanying desire to repli-
cate the fraud reduction seen in Card Present (CP) transactions has resulted
in a number of proposals to utilise EMV’s functionality for Internet-based
payments [29, 32, 10, 1, 38, 35]. There are two main advantages to these
proposals. Firstly, by integrating EMV into a CNP transaction, the card-
holder can prove that the card is in their physical possession. Secondly, only
the valid owner of a card can authorise a transaction, as only the card owner
should be capable of demonstrating that they know the EMV card’s secret
PIN. However, these approaches haven’t seen any real traction in the mar-
ket place. A possible explanation for this is the underlying assumption that
2A chargeback is a term used to refer to the situation in which a genuine cardholder
reports an unknown and possibly fraudulent transaction to their card issuer.
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users would make use of card readers connected to their PC platforms. This
assumption engenders an additional cost in the form of distributing card read-
ers to end-users. Unfortunately, even if the cost issue could be surmounted,
these approaches alone offer only limited security gains. This is due to the
lack of a trusted path between the card-reader and host, as well as a lack of
Operating System support for application isolation. Without these, a piece
of malicious software could passively observe PIN entries, actively modify
transaction data and possibly generate new transactions, enabling criminals
to remotely take control of users’ credit/debit cards. As highlighted in a re-
cent IBM report, the threat from malware is increasing at an unprecedented
rate [39]. Customised malware attacks and ‘spear phishing’ (directed phish-
ing attacks) are starting to target specific industries and organistations and
as such, present a particular challenge to the future of Internet-based CNP
transactions. There has, however, been a recent development with respect
to integrating EMV into CNP transactions that aims to indirectly address
the malware issue with the proposed use of “unconnected” card readers [35].
Unfortunately, this approach also suffers with respect to the additional costs
associated with distributing card readers to end-users and once deployed
cannot be updated to address new threats as they emerge. Furthermore, the
exact details of how these readers would operate remains unclear as there are
currently no publicly available specifications detailing their precise operation.
This report forms an extension to earlier work [8] in proposing a new se-
curity architecture for securing CNP transactions through the software emu-
lation of EMV (herein referred to as e-EMV) running on Trusted Platforms.
Here emulation of EMV-compliant cards confers “tamper resistent” proper-
ties normally associated with physical EMV-compliant cards. This makes
it possible to demonstrate card ownership and authentication as per EMV’s
SDA/DDA/CDA approaches in a virtualised environment. Additionally, by
creating an environment where EMV transaction flows can be mapped di-
rectly to e-EMV transactions we can avoid any expensive re-engineering of
the back-end financial network. Throughout the rest of this report we demon-
strate how our approach can achieve the following:
1. A merchant can ensure that a customer claiming to present a particular
e-EMV card is the legitimate owner of that card.
2. Issuing and acquiring banks can authenticate customers’ transaction
data to prevent authorisation of illegitimate payment requests.
3. A merchant can obtain a payment guarantee by being able to demon-
strably show authorisation of a transaction by a customer.
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4. A customer can be assured that the merchant with whom they are en-
gaging in a transaction will endeavor to protect sensitive cardholder
information prior to transaction initiation. Additionally, a customer
may be assured that parties privy to transaction-related data such as
the issuer, the acquirer or particularly third party processing facilities
satisfy pre-described security and privacy requirements prior to obtain-
ing cardholder data.
5. A customer can securely port their e-EMV card from one Trusted Plat-
form to another.
6. An executing e-EMV application can avoid the threat posed by malware
by hosting e-EMV cards in their own isolated memory partition, free
from observation and interference.
Additionally, whilst Static Data Authentication (SDA) remains a pop-
ular choice for POS EMV cards, e-EMV cards do not have the same cost
restrictions associated with their deployment. The popularity of SDA for
POS transactions is largely due to its utilisation of cheaper chip technology
compared to that of Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) and Combined
DDA and application cryptogram generation (CDA), which have additional
costs associated with the increased chip complexity. In certain deployments
it is more economical to accept a higher level of risk than to migrate directly
to a more expensive card. This is not the case with e-EMV.
The use of Trusted Computing in our setting allows for a direct migration
to DDA/CDA-compliant cards. This is because the price of the physical
medium, at least from the card issuer’s perspective, would essentially be zero.
Additionally, Trusted Computing platforms will not have the same processing
constraints in place as integrated chip cards, and can thus natively support
DDA/CDA capabilities. In this respect, the use of DDA/CDA allows the
merchant to determine whether or not the emulated card is genuine, as well as
being able to determine if the data personalised to the card has altered since
personalisation. An additional feature of our approach is a degree of future-
proofing inherent to our architecture. Updates to the EMV specifications can
be remodeled as software processes whereby their adoption and deployment
can occur at a greatly expedited rate.
The relative applicability of our approach is obviously dependent on the
ubiquity of Trusted Platforms in the market place. This is, however, not
an unreasonable assumption, and once made, allows a number of interesting
solutions to a whole host of security problems plaguing CNP transactions.
Currently available sales figures for 2005 [18] showed estimates of 32% of
all notebook systems shipped that year being TPM-enabled. This figure is
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expected to nearly triple by 2007, with processor and OS support to follow
soon after. Indeed, the synergistic approach of providing a secure payment
facility, through the use of e-EMV, could form a mutually beneficial arrange-
ment for both TPM manufacturers and card issuers. Potentially leading to
the faster adoption of Trusted Computing, which in turn would provide an
expanded customer base for e-EMV cards.
This report is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview
of the system model we will use to describe our architecture. This section
will also provide an outline of threats to generic Internet-based CNP transac-
tions. In Section 3, we examine some of the proposed standards and protocols
for protecting CNP transactions, as well as their various shortcomings rec-
onciled against our threat model. Section 4 and Section 5 will look at the
EMV and TCG standards respectively. These sections will act as a primer
for the technicalities presented in later sections. Section 6 provides a high-
level overview of our e-EMV architecture. Section 7 explains in detail the
procedures and processes involved in establishing an e-EMV card within a
TPM-enabled platform. Following on from this, Section 8 highlights how
normal EMV transaction flows can be mapped to an e-EMV transaction.
We concluded with Section 10.
2 System model
This section begins with an overview of the generic four-corner-model used
in card payment systems. Following on from this, we present a high-level
overview our e-EMV architecture. This section concludes with an examina-
tion of the more significant threats posed in securing CNP transactions
The model applied to card payment systems is typically referred to as the
four-corner-model (or a pull-model). Within this model, a number of steps
are necessary to complete a given transaction (see Fig. 1). Prior to a cus-
tomer being able to interact with a merchant, it is necessary that they follow
some issuer-specific enrollment procedure in order to obtain a physical pay-
ment card. A merchant, likewise, can only accept payments from a customer
if they have preregistered to accept payments for that customer’s particular
card type with their acquirer. The dashed line represents the boundary of
the financial network domain. Payment clearing occurs as follows:
• Step 1: The process begins with a customer signaling their intent to
purchase goods by forwarding a payment record to a merchant. In this
instance, the actual characteristics of a payment record differ depending
on the environment in which it was created. For an on-line purchase,
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Figure 1: Generic model for card processing.
a payment record typically includes the information embossed on the
customer’s physical payment card in conjunction with certain merchant
supplied information (such as the invoiced amount).
• Steps 2-5: These steps occur immediately after receiving the cus-
tomer’s payment record. They consist of a merchant submitting the
transaction details to their acquirer which will either authorise or reject
the transaction based on their interactions with the customer’s card is-
suer. After this, the merchant will either confirm payment or inform
the cardholder that their transaction has been rejected.
• Steps 6-9: Based upon the transaction being approved, either as a
result of a successful outcome from steps 2-5 or merchant risk man-
agement routines, steps 6-9 represent the account settlement process
through which funds are debited from a customer’s account and cred-
ited to the merchant’s.
Perhaps the most surprising feature of this model, is that a positive trans-
action authorisation (step 5) does not guarantee payment for a merchant. It
is merely an indication that the card account details being proffered have
not been reported stolen and that the customer has sufficient funds to cover
the transaction amount. Indeed, unless the card has been reported stolen,
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it is impossible for a card issuer, and by extension a merchant, to ascertain
whether a particular transaction is fraudulent or not.
In this regard, the merchant trusts (hopes) that the customer is the valid
account holder (or at least a delegate of the primary account holder) for the
presented payment record. This trust, or lack thereof, is largely underpinned
by the level of indemnity offered by card issuers to their customers in the
case of lost or stolen cards being used in illegitimate transactions. However,
the level of indemnity afforded to merchants is dependent on their adher-
ence to their acquirer supplied Merchant Operating Guidelines (MOG). The
MOG lays out the procedures that should be followed when processing CNP
transactions. An example of such a procedure would be a requirement to use
an Address Verification Service (AVS) which compares the billing address, as
entered by the customer, to that of the card issuer’s records. If they match,
this is seen as an indication that the customer owns the card being used. In
many cases a merchant may be held liable for chargebacks associated with
a transaction if they do not properly perform cardholder verification. This
verification is more difficult to do in a CNP setting.
Our e-EMV architecture closely follows the generic four corner model
as presented in Figure 1. The only differences in our approach are that the
communication channel between the customer and the merchant is now exclu-
sively Internet-based and that both card issuers and acquirers must provide
enrollment facilities to their e-EMV clients, separate to the enrollment facil-
ities for the physical issuance of an EMV card. For a card issuer this means
providing a mechanism through which customer’s can establish their e-EMV
cards on their platforms. Similarly, for an acquirer this means providing a
facility whereby a merchant can download an application that can interface
with an customer’s e-EMV application. In doing so, we assume the presence
of a PKI, much like the one that currently exists for EMV. In this regard,
enrollment facilities should be able to be authenticated by customers and
merchants via public key certificates issued by a particular card association.
In presenting this architecture we are making the important assumption
that TPM-enabled platforms are ubiquitous within the merchant/customer
domain, and additionally that both processor and operating system support
are available to all platforms. Furthermore, we make the underlying assump-
tion that a card issuer has extended credit or debit facilities to a particular
customer. For credit-based cards, prior to enrollment in this system, we as-
sume that the applicant has been pre-approved a card using standard credit
checking procedures. For debit-based cards, we assume that the applicant
has an active account with the acquirer to which they are applying.
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2.1 Threats
This section will attempt to enumerate the various threats faced by generic
card payment systems with a specific emphasis on CNP transactions. Follow-
ing on from this, in Section 3, we will examine some specific CNP-enabling
protocols reconciled against the general threats presented below.
Broadly speaking the threats faced by the customer, merchant and finan-
cial network domain can be generalised into the following categories, where
ordering does not reflect significance:
• Lack of Integrity
It is important for all parties that the integrity of the transactional data
being sent is protected. Neither the merchant nor the customer should
be able to modify the details of the transaction after the payment has
been authorised by the customer’s card issuer. We assume transaction
data within the confines of the financial network domain is adequately
protected.
• Loss of Confidentiality and Privacy
A strong positive correlation exists between confidentiality and pri-
vacy. Cardholders would like to keep their personal account details
from being disclosed to unknown third parties. In this context, there
is a distinction to be made between order information and payment
information. Confidentiality and privacy of order information may be
desirable to avoid customer profiling in which a customer’s shopping
habits are observed and recorded. In addition to this, some users may
like to keep the browsing phase of their transactions private. This lat-
ter concern of browsing/ordering privacy isn’t immediately germane to
our proposal and will only receive a cursory examination in later sec-
tions. By contrast, confidentiality and privacy of payment information
is essential as disclosure of account information can lead to card cloning
and illegitimate use of a customer’s account.
Contrary to privacy of order information, privacy of account informa-
tion has received a lot of press of late. Of special note is the recent
break-in at CardSystems Solutions [44] and the subsequent exposure
of some 40 million debt and credit card accounts. This breach took
place in spite of CardSystems Solutions passing a conformance audit
for Visa and Mastercard’s joint Payment Card Industry (PCI) data se-
curity standard [40]. The PCI standard is intended to provide a base
set of requirements for parties involved in the storing, processing or
transition of cardholder data. The obvious question arises — how do
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you perform auditing to ensure compliance on an ongoing basis? This
type of rolling audit would be desirable form both a customer and PCI
standpoint as it would allow verification prior to processing. We will
see how such an auditing system can be implemented in Section 7.
• Lack of Authentication and Authorisation
As attacks such as phishing and pharming become more prevalent,
there is a corresponding need for customers to authenticate merchant
identities prior to transaction initiation. Merchants would also like to
authenticate that the customer identity claimed during a transaction is
actually the one held by the transacting party. If a merchant accepts a
fraudulent transaction they can be held liable for the value of the fraud
as well as potentially having their processing costs increased by their
acquirer. Additionally, card issuers and acquirers would like to authen-
ticate customers’ transaction data so that they can avoid authorising
illegitimate payments. Additionally, card issuers would like to make
sure that a valid customer with a valid card instigated and authorised
each payment request. A card issuer can be liable if they authorise a
fraudulent transaction.
• Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is closely allied with customer authorisation. A mer-
chant needs to have proof that the customer agreed to pay a specified
amount for their goods or services. In the event of an illegitimate
transaction (or possible buyer’s remorse — an act whereby a customer
attempts to refute a legitimate purchase), in order to avoid being held
liable and paying the associated chargeback costs, a merchant would
need to submit evidence to the customer’s card issuer showing that the
customer did indeed either, authorise the transaction, or receive the
goods.
A final issue of potential concern is that of mail non-receipt. This is
where a card is intercepted en route to a customer; this was the fourth
biggest category of credit card fraud in the U.K in 2004. We will examine
this in relation to the distribution of e-EMV cards in Sections 6 and 7.
3 Card payments and the Internet
In this section we will examine some of the more significant protocols and
standards for protecting CNP transactions.
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3.1 SSL
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol was first introduced in 1994 by the
Netscape corporation. The protocol itself was designed to provide end-to-end
security services to connections running over TCP/IP and has since become
the de facto standard for the secure transmission of CNP transaction infor-
mation. However, this use of SSL can be seen as more of a highjacking of
an existing technology rather than a systematic approach to securing CNP
transactions. In this regard, SSL establishes a session between a customer
and a merchant and acts as a facilitator for the secure transfer of account
details, of which, quintessentially, the PAN, CSC and relevant billing infor-
mation are all requisite elements. SSL’s primary advantage, and perhaps
the main reason for its pervasive deployment, is that it requires no addi-
tional equipment for a cardholder and not much additional inconvenience
for a merchant. However, what happens outside of an established transfer
session is not within the scope of SSL’s protection remit.
In this respect, the confidentiality and integrity afforded by SSL only pro-
tects against attacks from parties attempting to eavesdrop on a transaction
between a customer and a merchant. It says nothing as to validity of the
data emanating from either end-point. Potentially the biggest deficiency in
the use of SSL for CNP payments is the lack of customer authentication.
Even though SSL provides a provision for client (customer) authentication,
it is seldom, if ever used. This stems from the inconvenience and cost as-
sociated with distributing and managing client certificates. A further issue
relevant to client certificates, as mentioned in Section 1, is the problem of the
perpetual increase in malware-affected platforms. If the private component
of a key bound to a client SSL certificate is exposed to malicious software on
a platform, then it becomes impossible to attest with any certainty that an
entity purporting to be certified is as claimed.
3.2 SET
SET differs from SSL in that it was designed explicitly as a payment protocol
and addresses a number of the deficiencies found in the SSL-based approach
for facilitating on-line card-based commerce. However, despite improvements
over an SSL-based approach, SET is no longer being deployed for use in CNP
transactions. A number of theories have been put forward to explain why
SET never became a success. These range from ease of use to the cost and
difficulty of maintaining a stable PKI. For a more through treatment of SET
than the one presented here, we refer readers to [36, p.100-123].
SET allowed every entity that was party to a transaction to be authenti-
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cated. SET used a certification authority hierarchy in which all participants
were required to enroll. Certificates were then exchanged allowing authenti-
cation to occur. When it came to making a purchase within SET, a purchase
order message would be constructed in such a way that only the merchant
could see the Order Information (OI) and only the payment gateway could
see the Payment Information (PI). This was accomplished though what was
termed a ‘dual signature’, whereby messages intended for the merchant and
messages intended for the payment gateway could be linked without simul-
taneously revealing both. In this instance, the PI comprised transaction
related data as well as a transaction ID which were then carried in a “digital
envelope”. A one time session key was created for bulk encryption which
then encrypted the PI, the dual signature and a hash of the OI. This key
was then enciphered with the public key of the payment gateway. Only the
gateway could decrypt the said envelope and obtain the key to decrypt the
enciphered PI.
Authorisation was more complex insofar as a payment needed to be au-
thorised by both the customer and their bank. The merchant forwarded the
encrypted PI information to the payment gateway along with their own au-
thorisation information. This information comprised, amongst other things,
an authorisation block containing a transaction ID encrypted with a ses-
sion key and signed with the merchant’s private key. This allowed the pay-
ment gateway to verify both parties by their respective signatures as well as
confirming that they were referring to the same transaction by comparing
ID values. One of the nice features of SET was that it did allow for non-
repudiation of transactions — assuming the transaction was authorised by
the card issuer.
3.3 3-D Secure, Verified by Visa and SecureCode
3-D Secure and both Visa’s [5, 6] and MasterCard’s [31] proposals, Verified
by Visa (VbV) and SecureCode respectively, attempt to provide cardholder
authorisation for Internet-based CNP transactions, and in this respect, can
be seen as an adjunct to the SSL-based approach outlined in Section 3.1.
Both proposals are designed solely to provide cardholder authorisation and
both require customers to preregister their account with their card issuer
prior to using the system. During the registration procedure the cardholder
chooses a secret password that will later be used to authorise subsequent
CNP transactions. These authorisations may later act as non-repudiable
evidence in case of a dispute. Both the VbV and SecureCode proposals
provide equivalent functionality (as they are both derivations of 3-D Secure),
so we will concentrate our discussion on Visa’s proposal as an illustrative
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example.
In the VbV approach, during the payment phase of a transaction a cus-
tomer’s browser is redirected by a merchant plug-in component to an ap-
propriate ACS for their account. The customer authenticates to this ACS
by providing their username and password, as established in the registration
phase. Based upon the correctness of the supplied username/password com-
bination, the ACS formulates its response (authenticated/not authenticated)
and signs it. This signature is then passed through the customer’s browser
and onto the merchant plug-in. The plug-in then verifies the ACS signature
and decides if it wishes to proceed with the transaction. A validated response
can later be used as evidence to show the customer authorised a particular
payment. If the customer account number is not registered with any ACS, a
visa directory server informs the merchant plug-in and normal MOTO-based
authorisation procedures are attempted.
The use of 3-D secure (and its derivatives) can be seen as forcing an ad-
ditional customer authentication prior to the completion of a transaction.
However, given the nature of current implementations, especially with re-
gard to the static nature of current authentication information (based on
passwords), it is difficult to see how authoritative this authentication would
be, and how non-repudiable the evidence of transaction authorisation would
be. Indeed, there are various threats that affect the security of any CNP pro-
posal, most notably spyware and phishing attacks. However, 3-D Secure’s
real benefit comes in reducing the economies of scale possible with card skim-
ming attacks. An attacker obtaining a customer’s card details, possibly by
means of a compromised POS terminal, will no longer be able to complete a
fraudulent purchase using the obtained information as a PAN and CSC are
no longer sufficient to authorise a CNP transaction authorisation. Unfortu-
nately, in this instance the use of a static authenticator may prove no less
of a barrier to obtaining card account details. Perhaps the greatest threat
to such a scheme would be that of an automated attack script that com-
promises cardholder platforms and installs malware that monitors keyboard
activity and generate new transactions using the observed authorisation data.
Additionally, a phishing site that purports to provide a 3-D secure plug-in




Of the three protocol suites presented thus far only SET is no longer being
deployed. The SETCo web-site1 is inoperative and the standard is conspic-
uous by its absence from the latest version of the EMV specifications [13]3.
There are a number of theories put forward as to why SET never became
a success ranging from ease of use to the cost and difficulty of maintaining
a stable PKI. However, with regards to the threats posed in Section 2.1
SET fared rather favorably in comparison to SSL. Correspondingly, the 3-
D Secure proposals, with the possible exception of customer authentication
and non-repudiation, has similar security defects as an SSL-based approach
to securing CNP transactions. In fact 3-D Secure relies quite heavily on
SSL/TLS to secure the communications between each entity involved in a
transaction. In both 3-D Secure and SSL customer account information is
sent to the merchant with no guarantees as to privacy or confidentiality of
this information. Of the three proposals, SSL is by far the most ubiquitous in
its deployment. However, SSL suffers quite badly from its lack of client-side
(customer) authentication.
4 EMV
In the United Kingdom the use of magnetic stripe cards for point of sale
transactions has been phased out in favour of EMV-compliant Integrated
Chip Cards (ICCs). The susceptibility of magnetic strip cards to cloning
and the projected fraud losses associated with the continued use of this tech-
nology, estimated to be in the region of £1 billion per annum by the end of
the decade in the U.K [3], has resulted in a migration to the more resilient
EMV ICCs. In this instance the cost of migrating from magnetic stripe cards
to EMV ICCs (which was less than future projected losses from fraud) cat-
alyzed the transition process. France, which has been using a chip-and-pin
based system for the last 12 years, saw a post-migration reduction, on the
order of 80%, in fraud on domestic transactions [33].
This section aims to provide a brief overview of the EMV specifications,
particularly in relation to transaction processing and EMV key usage. EMV,
as described in the current iteration of the standard [11, 12, 13, 14] defines
the full spectrum of interactions, from the physical to the logical, between
1http://www.setco.org/
3There had previously been an annex in version 4.0 of the specification [10] outlining
the integration of SET and EMV for enabling “transaction processing for chip electronic
commerce”.
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an ICC and an Integrated Chip (IC) enabled POS terminal. EMV supports
both cardholder authentication through new Cardholder Verification Meth-
ods (CVMs) and ICC authentication through either Static Data Authenti-
cation (SDA), Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) or Combined DDA and
application cryptogram generation (CDA). The introduction of new CVMs
and SDA/DAA/CDA functionality aims to reduce credit and debit card fraud
across the board through improved authentication and authorisation mech-
anisms. Additionally, depending on the results of card and terminal risk
management routines, which are designed to protect issuers and acquirers
respectively, transactions can be completed either on-line or off-line.
4.1 Transaction processing
The processing of an EMV transaction begins when the card is inserted into
a POS terminal and comprises of a number of distinct stages. However, the
stages, as presented here, do not follow a linear path. Some of them operate
under a not before but not after semantic and some of the steps, where
indicated, are optional.
1. Application Selection: The terminal issues a SELECT command
[11, p.129] to choose the appropriate EMV application from a multi-
application card. The selection procedure can be either direct or in-
direct and is based on the same Application Identifiers (AID) being
supported by both the terminal and the ICC.
2. Initiate Application Processing: The terminal commences applica-
tion processing by issuing a GET PROCESSING OPTIONS command
[13, p.63] to the card. In response to this the card returns the Ap-
plication File Locator (AFL) and the Application Interchange Profile
(AIP). The AFL prides a table of contents like structure of the pub-
licly available information provided by the card application. The AIP
indicates the application functions that are supported by the card such
as if off-line SDA/DDA (Static Data Authentication/Dynamic Data
Authentication) is available or if card holder verification is supported.
3. Read Application Data: A number of READ RECORD commands
[13, p.69] are issued by the POS terminal to the card to read the nec-
essary data for the transaction to proceed. As part of this step, the
terminal makes sure all mandatory data elements are present on the
card.
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4. Processing Restrictions: This is a mandatory step performed by
the terminal and doesn’t require any interaction with the ICC. The
purpose of this step is to ascertain the level of comparability between
the application running on the card and the application running on the
terminal [13, p.100]. Based on this comparison, the terminal takes an
appropriate action — including possibly terminating the transaction.
5. Off-line Data Authentication: This is an optional step in which
the terminal issues an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command [13,
p.65]. There are three options for off-line data authentication avail-
able in EMV-compliant cards. The first is SDA, the second is DDA
and the third is CDA. SDA allows the terminal to determine if the
personalised data on the card has been modified since personalisation.
DDA is more complex in that it allows for the same checks as SDA
but also enables the terminal to determine if the card is genuine or
not through a challenge response mechanism. This involves the ICC
generating a dynamic signature (see Section 4.2.1) over the terminal
supplied challenge. CDA is similar to DDA except the dynamic signa-
ture generated by the ICC includes an Application Cryptogram (AC)
(see Section 4.2.2) which can be verified by the terminal to provide a
degree of non-repudiation.
6. Card holder Verification: This optional step [13, p.103] allows the
terminal to potentially verify the authenticity of the cardholder in re-
lation to the card based on a particular CVM. It is also used by the
cardholder as a means to authorise a particular transaction. CVM
methods range from no verification required to both off-line and on-
line PIN verification.
7. Terminal Risk Management and Action Analysis: The purpose
of terminal risk management [13, p.107] and terminal action analy-
sis [13, p.111] is to protect the issuer, acquirer and payment system
from fraud. Based on variety of measures, such as floor limits, random
transaction selection or velocity checking a transaction may be forced
to complete on-line.
8. Card Risk Management and Action Analysis: Details of card
risk management are proprietary to card issuers and are outside the
scope of the EMV specification. As a result of card action analysis
[13, p.115] (which is based on the results of the card risk management
routines), an ICC may decide to complete a transaction by either going
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on-line, remaining off-line, requesting a referral or rejecting the trans-
action outright.
9. On-line Authorisation: During normal transaction processing the
terminal may decide to proceed with an on-line check. This could be
as a result of a number of factors. The terminal may only support
on-line transaction processing or the store attendant may have found
the customer suspicious. It could also be as a result of the outcome of
either Steps 7 and 8. In any case, a transaction was deemed outside
the risk profile for off-line completion and requires further scrutiny
by the customer’s card issuer. An AC is generated by the card and
forwarded to the card issuer which, after examination, determines if the
transaction should go ahead or not. The card issuer returns another
AC informing the card whether or not to proceed with the current
transaction.
10. Issuer-to-Card Script Processing: In order to allow card updates
in the field, the card issuer can return scripts via the terminal to the
ICC for processing. These scripts are not necessarily relevant to the
current transaction and may be used to update applications during the
utilisation phase of the ICC’s lifecycle, or to transition the card into a
blocked or unblocked state.
4.2 EMV Key Usage
4.2.1 SDA and DDA
The number of keys in an EMV-compliant ICC depends on whether the card
is SDA or DDA compliant for off-line authentication. In the case of SDA, the
ICC maintains the public key of the issuer (in a certificate signed by a card
association CA) as well as a signature of its static application data created
using the card issuer’s private key. The terminal, in turn, stores the public
key of the card association CA in order to verify the signed static application
data (by obtaining and verifying the card issuer’s public key from the ICC).
DDA is similar except that in addition to the SDA keys, the card itself
has its own key pair, of which the public part is stored in an ICC certificate.
This certificate is signed with the private key of the card issuer. Retrieval of
the public key by the terminal is identical to SDA except for one additional
step. The terminal uses its embedded CA public key to verify the certifi-
cate containing the issuer’s public key which it then uses to verify the ICC
certificate. If this verification is successful the terminal extracts the ICC
public key from the ICC certificate. In DDA, the ICC public key is used
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to generate a signature over the static application data as well as a random
number provided by the terminal. This allows the terminal to determine
whether the card is genuine or not as well as being able to ascertain if the
data personalized in the card has been altered since card personalization, as
per SDA.
4.2.2 Application Cryptograms
Application Cryptograms are generated by the ICC and card issuers using
MACs based on a shared secret. The ICC and its issuer share a long-term
MAC master key, the ICC Application Cryptogram Master Key MKAC . Ap-
plication Cryptogram Session Keys, SKACs, are derived from these master
keys using a session key derivation function (as defined in Annex A1.3 of
[12]) that uses a card’s Application Transaction Counter (ATC) as diversi-
fication data. An ATC is a counter that keeps track of the total number of
transactions performed by a card. In this way an SKAC will be different for
every AC generation.
To avoid the issuer having to store, a unique master key for every card
the master key is itself a result of a derivation process. The issuer uses the
ICC’s Primary Account Number (PAN), the PAN sequence number as well
as its Issuer Master Key (IMK) to dynamically generate the shared MAC
master keys.
In the EMV specifications session keys are used to protect transaction
messages. EMV defines four different types of transaction messages (ACs).
Depending on the reconciliation of card and terminal risk management rou-
tines one of the following will be generated by the card: an Application
Authentication Cryptogram (AAC), an Application Authorisation Referral
(AAR), an Authorisation Request Cryptogram (ARQC) or a Transaction
Certificate (TC). If the transaction is approved, the ICC will generate a TC
which will be passed to the terminal and can be used to claim payment dur-
ing the clearing process. If a transaction is declined, the ICC will generate
an AAC. In the event that the transaction needs to be approved on-line the
ICC generates an ARQC which will be forwarded to the issuer. The issuer
will then reply with an ARPC indicating whether the transaction should be
approved or declined, in which case a TC or an AAC will be generated by
the ICC.
4.2.3 Cardholder Verification
The EMV standard specifics a number of CVMs ranging from: no CVM re-
quired, to signature-based CVM, to both on-line and off-line PIN verifiction.
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In supporting off-line PIN verification, the card maintains a public key pair
for PIN encipherment. Typically, this PIN encipherment key pair will be the
same as the ICC key pair. The terminal may use the public portion of this
key pair (depending on terminal’s support for either plaintext or enciphered
PIN verification) to encipher the PIN entered from the PIN pad which the
terminal forwards to the ICC for verification. Based on the outcome of this
verification the ICC determines if it wishes to proceed with the transaction
or not based on card action analysis routines.
5 Trusted Computing
This section, in conjunction with Section 4, is intended as primer for Sections
6 and 7 by describing and outlining the trusted building blocks on which we
build our e-EMV architecture. Trusted Computing as discussed here, relates
directly to the type of system espoused by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG). In this case, a trusted system is one that behaves in the expected
manner for a particular purpose.
The current documentation from the TCG is a rather nebulous set of spec-
ifications encompassing TPM design [24, 25, 26], specifications for trusted
networking [21, 22, 23] as well as PC [17] and server specifications [27]. This,
however, is by no means the totality of effort invested in Trusted Comput-
ing. Trusted Computing also encompasses processor design [30, 2] as well as
Operating System support [34, 37]. We will now examine the role TPM, OS
and processor play in the design of trusted systems.
5.1 TPM Specification
The TPM forms the core of all efforts in Trusted Computing. The TPM
itself comes in the form of a microcontroler with Cryptographic Coprocessor
(CCP) capabilities that resides on a platform’s motherboard. The TPM, in
conjunction with offering a secure storage area for keying material, is capable
of providing the following functionality:
5.1.1 Protected capabilities and shielded locations
The TPM provides a number of internally shielded locations that are only
accessible through the use of protected capabilities. These locations provide
secure areas in which the platform can operate on sensitive data. Perhaps
the most important shielded locations in terms of any discussion of Trusted
Computing functionality are Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). A
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PCR is 20 byte storage area that acts as a repository for recording integrity
altering events within a platform.
5.1.2 Integrity Measurement and Storage
Trusted Computing defines several roots of trust within a TPM. Integrity
measurement and storage fall under the purview of the Root of Trust for
Measurement (RTM) and the Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) respectively.
The RTM is a computing engine that is responsible for making intrinsi-
cally reliable integrity measurements. By the same token, the RTS is respon-
sible for maintaining an accurate and sufficiently detailed record of the events
measured by the RTM. The use of integrity in this context refers to ensuring
that state transitions are accurately reflected in the current platform state.
This differs slightly to the type of integrity espoused by EMV which concerns
itself with card details not being modified since perssonalation. However, as
we shall see in Section 7, this static EMV-based definition can be modeled
by the more dynamic Trusted Computing based definition. Indeed we show
how, in modeling this EMV definition, how we can retain the dynamism of-
fered by Trusted Computing whilst remaining true to post-personalisation
context offered by EMV.
1. Measurement: Measuring events within a platform is a two-stage
process that begins with an extend command. This command, more
commonly referred to as ‘extending the digest’, appends a hash of the
event being measured to one of a number of PCRs located internally
to the TPM. These PCRs store a representative hash of all the events
generated by a platform, forming a picture of the current platform
state. This digest extension process can be illustrated as follows:
PCRx = HASH(PCRx ‖ measured value)
Here PCRx is the digest being updated. The use of this approach
guarantees that related measured values will not be discarded as the
previous register value is incorporated into the new register value. The
use of measured value is a representation of embedded data or program
code executing within a platform.
The other stage in this process is the writing of events, as reflected in a
particular PCR, to permanent storage. This writing to storage, or log-
ging, of integrity altering events within a platform occurs in the Stored
Measurement Log (SML). The SML maintains sequences of events to
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which new events are appended. Due to storage constraints this log
will typically be located externally to the TPM.
The two most important properties abstracted from the brief discus-
sion outlined above are firstly, that atomicity of extensions be ensured,
and secondly, that updates be noncommutative. That is to say, up-
dates should follow an all or nothing semantic and the order in which
extension events occur matters.
2. Storage: Storage, as defined by the TCG refers to two distinct con-
cepts. The first, which we just covered, refers to the intermediate step
between measurement and reporting. The second, which we will discuss
in the next section, refers to the protection of keys and data within a
TPM. The responsibility for the protection of said keys and other sen-
sitive data within a TPM falls under the oversight of the RTS. In this
regard, the RTS maintains a small area of volatile memory used for
performing cryptographic operations and storing data.
5.1.3 TPM Keys and Key Usage
TPM Keys are stored in a tree structure with the Storage Root Key (SRK)
forming the root of all keys stored within the TPM Key tree hierarchy.
Within this hierarchy every node (TPM Key) has an assigned attribute des-
ignation as well as a defined key type. Attribute designations, in the context
of a TPM Key, help to define key mobility. A key can be designated either
migratable, certified-migratable or non-migratable. Keys with either of first
two designations are capable of leaving a TPM, whilst non-migratable keys
are inextricably bound to a single platform. Key types are used to define
what particular operations a TPM Key is capable of performing. For ex-
ample, a key could have an signing type or storage type depending on the
designation of its usage.
Due to the limitations in available memory, it is necessary to move inac-
tive keys into off-chip storage areas from time to time. This process is man-
aged by the Key Cache Manager (KCS). Inactive keys are first encrypted
into a “blob” using a key controlled by the SRK. These blobs are opaque
outside of the TPM and may be bound to the platform on which the TPM
resides. Binding, in this context means that blobs may only be decrypted
on the platform that created them, as the decryption key may be fixed to a
particular TPM. The exception to this rule is the case where the wrapping
key responsible for creating the blob is migratable.
In addition to the attribute designations and key types outlined above,
there are two key pairs in particular that hold special significance in Trusted
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Computing. These key pairs are the Endorsement Key pair (EK) and the
Attestation Identity Key (AIK) pair. Within a TCG-conformant platform,
AIK key pairs act as aliases for the EK and are responsible for attesting
platform states. AIK pairs are used because an EK pair is unique per TPM
instance and this is considered a possible risk to user privacy should the EK
pair become connected with personally identifiable information. As there
is no prescribed limit on the number of AIKs that can be used within a
platform, this provides an anonymity mechanism, whereby the TPM can use
different AIKs each time it attests to platform integrity metrics.
5.1.4 Reporting and Attestation
The final root of trust within a Trusted Platform is the Root of Trust for
Reporting (RTR). Its function is to faithfully recount information held by
the RTS to third parties. The mechanism through which this is achieved is
referred to as ‘attestation’.
Attestation within the context of Trusted Computing is the mechanism
whereby a TPM-enabled platform adduces certain state characteristics that
govern a platform’s trustworthiness. This evidence is consumed by integrity
verifiers that use this evidence, in conjunction with the perceived trustwor-
thiness of the entity performing the attestation, to establish a trust level in
the attesting platform.
The basic steps involved in an attestation are as follows:
1. An external entity requests one or more PCR values.
2. A platform agent culls the SML for the events responsible for generating
the requested PCR values.
3. The TPM signs the requested registers using an AIK by calling the
TPM Quote command [26, pp.155].
4. The agent then obtains various credentials (the platform credential,
the conformance credential, attestation identity credential — see Sec-
tion 5.1.6) that vouch for the TPM. These credentials, along with the
relevant portion of the SML and the requested signed PCR values are
returned to the requesting entity.
5. The requesting entity then examines the credentials, checks signatures
and compares a hash of the received SML entries to the attested PCR
values. If they match the verifier can gain some assurances as to the
current state of the attestor’s platform at the time the attestation was
made.
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How this attestation is actually performed differs between version 1.1b
and version 1.2 of the specifications. Version 1.1b uses what is referred to as
the “Privacy CA” model whilst version 1.2 introduced a new model in the
form of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).
Privacy CA
The Privacy CA approach is employed as a means of issuing AIK cre-
dentials (see Section 5.1.6) to TPM-enabled platforms. These creden-
tials are used to vouch for the trustworthiness of an attestation origi-
nating from a platform. credential acquirement is achieved as follows:
a Tspi TPM CollateIdentityRequest command [28, pp.111] is issued
by a platform prior to the generation of an AIK key pair, this com-
mand gathers all the required information necessary for a Privacy CA
to examine the requestor’s platform. This information includes various
credentials that vouch for the trustworthiness of the TPM itself. Pro-
vided the evidence presented by a user’s platform is validated by the
Privacy CA, the Privacy CA will encrypt the newly generated AIK cre-
dential with a symmetric key, which in turn is encrypted with the EK of
the requesting platform. In this way only a specific platform is capable
of decrypting the credential and performing the TPM ActivateIdentity
command [26, pp.151]. This then allows an AIK private component to
be used to generate signatures over platform integrity metrics.
There were, however, significant concerns raised over the ‘privacy’ af-
forded to this solution. In this model, the Privacy CA is capable of
linking individual AIK public keys to a particular TPM. This was due
to the fact that in order to obtain an AIK credential it was necessary
for a TPM to disclose its AIK — EK binding. Potentially leading to
the exposure of personally identifiable information in the process.
DAA
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) by contrast is a group signature
scheme without an anonymity revocation property. DAA was designed
as an optional extra for version 1.2 of the TPM specification and aims
to address some of the privacy concerns that arose in the Privacy CA
model. DAA differs form the Privacy CA model in that it doesn’t
disclose AIK keys to an issuer, and hence aims to limit the exposure
AIK — EK bindings.
Enrolling a TPM-enabled platform with a DAA issuer occurs when a
platform instigates a run of the DAA join protocol. During this protocol
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the platform authenticates itself to an issuer via the public component
of its EK and proves (in the form of a zero-knowledge proof) that it
knows a non-migratable, TPM controlled secret value f . In addition to
this ,the platform provides a pseudonym NI = ζ
fP , where ζ is derived
from the issuer’s long term base name and fP is a secret associated
with the TPM-enabled platform.
Providing the issuer finds the above acceptable, it will issue the plat-
form a credential in the form of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) [9]
signature on the TPM-controlled secret value f . This signature will
later be used to convince a verifier that it has previously completed a
run of the DAA protocol with respect to a particular issuer. In this
way a DAA issuer never becomes aware of the relationship between an
individual platform, as identified by its EK pair, and its AIK pairs.
Subsequent to a run of the DDA join protocol, the DAA-Signing pro-
tocol can be used to generate a DAA signature on a AIK public key.
During this process, the platform is only identified by a pseudonym.
As in the join protocol, this pseudonym is of the form NV = ζ
f , where
now the selection of ζ determines the anonymity properties of the at-
testation process. The value of the base ζ will typically be chosen by
the verifier.
5.1.5 Delegation and Migration
Delegation and migration are new features that were added to version 1.2
of the TPM specifications. The delegation model used in TPM v1.2 aims
to address some of the concerns surrounding the ‘super-user’ like privileges
afforded to TPM Owner. The concept of a TPM Owner refers to an entity
that inserted a shared secret into a TPM shielded-location during the TPM
enablement process. Knowledge of this secret confers the right to execute
certain protected capabilities within a TPM. Previous to version 1.2 of the
TPM specifications the delegation model that was employed required the
revelation of the TPM Owner secret in order to allow a subordinate process
access to a particular protected capability. In order to better apply ‘the
principle of least privilege’ a new model was introduced. This new model
involves the creation of new authorisation data and inferring certain owner
privileges to it. In this way delegation can be much finer grained as it does
not require the revelation of the TPM Owner’s secret.
Migration is also a new concept introduced in the TPM v1.2 specifica-
tions. Migration is an operation that permits the secure transfer of migratory
keys from one TCG-compliant platform to another. This transfer occurs in
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such a manner as to allow the new platform full usage of the migrated key.
The notion of a migratable key can be subdivided into two categories, a Mi-
gratable Key (MK) and a Certified Migratable Key (CMK). MKs are keys
that, while not bound to a specific TPM, can be transferred to another TPM
if appropriate authorisation is provided. CMKs are similar, insofar as they
also require appropriate authorisation in order to migrate. However, their
migration is conditional on receiving permission from a relevant Migration
Authority (MA). For more details pertaining to the use and operation of
CMKs we refer the reader to Appendix A.
5.1.6 TCG Credentials
The issue of certification plays an important role in defining what is meant
by a “Trusted Platform”. In this regard there are five interrelated credentials
that adduce the existence of a correctly functioning TPM within a platform.
• Endorsement credential: This credential vouches that a TPM is
genuine and is issued by whomever generated the EK pair. Typically
this will be the TPM manufacturer or vendor.
• Conformance credentials: These credentials vouch that the TPM
design conforms with established evaluation guidelines as laid out by
the TCG. These credentials are issued by entities with sufficient credi-
bility to evaluate a TPM. Typically a conformance testing facility.
• Platform credential: This credential provides evidence that a plat-
form contains a TPM and incorporates references to both the endorse-
ment and conformance credentials. This is typically be generated by a
platform vendor.
• AIK credentials: These credential provide evidence as to the exis-
tence of an AIK within a TPM. These credentials incorporate references
to endorsement, conformance and platform credentials and are typically
generated by a Privacy CA.
• Validation credential: This credential provides signed reference
measurements (digests of the measured components taken during de-
velopment when it is believed to be in a stable condition) which can
be compared against runtime measurements to assure interested par-
ties that their application is performing as intended. These runtime
measurements will be signed by AIK public keys.
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5.2 Trusted PC and Trusted Server Specifications
Both the Trusted PC [17] and Trusted Server [27] specifications provide
generic implementation reference documentation for building Trusted Plat-
forms at the client and server side respectively.
The Trusted PC specification deals primarily with instantiating the var-
ious elements involved in transitioning a platform from its pre-boot to its
post-boot state. Within this transition, various usage constraints are defined
for TPM components, such as usage of PCR registers as well as guidelines
for option ROMs. The specification also outlines programmatic interfaces to
the BIOS in the form of the TCG Software Stack (TSS) as well as detailing
how physical presence is demonstrated on a TPM enabled platform.
The Server specification details much of the same functionality as the
Trusted PC specification. However, it introduces a number of new concepts
that are of special interest in server architectures. In particular it highlights
the distinctions between partitions and platforms. The specification defines
a partition as: “the hardware and firmware environment, which provides the
support for the execution of a single operating system image within a sep-
arated trust environment”. A platform is later defined as: “the complete
package of physical hardware and firmware that a manufacturer produces
for a single server product. This may be configured as one or more parti-
tions.” The issue of dynamic reconfiguration is addressed insofar as staing the
measurement of asynchronous events are the responsibility of the post-boot
software environment.
5.3 Trusted Server Specification
5.4 TNC Specification
The Trusted Network connect (TNC) specification forms a expatiated sub-
class of the Infrastructure Work Group (IWG) interoperability specification
[20] and deals predominantly with enabling the enforcement of operator con-
trolled policies for endpoint security in determining network access.
TNC can be seen as an enhancement to the IETF’s AAA authorization
frameworks [41, 42, 43] in offering a way of assaying an endpoint’s integrity to
ensure it complies with a particular predefined policy. A particular instance
of this would be ensuring that a certain software state exists on a platform
prior to the platform being granted network access, for example, requiring
anti-viral or software patch updates to be installed. The means through
which this is achieved follows a three phase approach of assess, isolate and
remediate which we briefly discuss next.
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The assess phase deals predominantly with an Access Requestor (AR)
wishing to gain access to a restricted network. In this phase the Integrity
Measurement Verifier (IMV) on a Policy Decision Point (PDP) examines
the integrity metrics coming from the Integrity Measurement Verifier (IMC)
on the AR’s platform and compares them to its network access policies.
From this process of reconciliation the PDP informs a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) of its decision pertaining to an AR’s access request. The PEP
is then responsible for enforcing the PDP’s decision. As an extension to
the assessment phase, in the event that the AR has been authenticated but
failed the IMV’s integrity-verification procedure, a process of isolation may
be instigated whereby the PDP passes instructions to the PEP which are
then passed to the AR directing it to an isolation network. The final phase,
remediation, is where the AR on the isolation network obtains the requisite
integrity-related updates that will allow it to satisfy the PDP’s access policy.
5.5 OS and Processor Support
Both Operating System and Processor support represent integral components
in the realisation of Trusted Platforms. The process beings with a TPM
providing a secure initialisation facility which measures the operational state
of an OS as a platform transitions from a pre-boot into a post-boot state. If
this post-boot state matches some agreed upon “good” value then the OS can
be seen to be functioning correctly. This correctly functioning OS can then
provide a stable baseline from which the future execution of programs can
be measured. As well as providing access to TPM functionality, a Trused
OS will provide sandboxed execution environments in which applications
can run. In this respect, processor and chipset extensions will provide the
hardware support for the creation of these protected environments and act
as a basis for enforcing application level sandboxing within main memory.
In this regard, Microsoft’s Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB)
[34, 37] forms an illustrative example of OS level security services for a
Trusted Platform.The following are generic security services for a Trusted
OS based on an isolation kernel and we assume the presence of such func-
tionality in our later discussions.
1. No interference: Ensuring that the program is free from interference
from entities outside its execution space.
2. Trusted path: Assumes a trusted path between a program and an input
device.
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3. Secure inter-process communication: Enabling one program to com-
municate with another, without compromising the confidentiality and
integrity of its own memory locations.
4. Non-observation: An executing process and the memory locations it is
working upon should be free from observation.
With regard to processor support. There have been a number initiatives
in this domain, namely Intel’s LaGrande, AMD’s Pacifica and ARM’s Trust-
Zone. Ostensibly, each technology provide similar functionality. However,
TrustZone is targeted at the embedded systems market whilst LaGrande and
Pacifica target PC client and Server architectures. All three technologies aim
to provide hardware enhancements that enable compartmentalised memory
locations for applications to execute in. In this respect a Trusted processor
provides the underlying service on which an OS can build its services.
6 An overview of e-EMV
This section aims to present a high-level overview of e-EMV. In doing so we
introduce a number of topics that are essential to the establishment of an
e-EMV card within a Trusted Platform. The aim here is to provide function-
ality akin to that of a standard EMV card by replicating EMV functionality
through procedures and capabilities natively supported by a TPM-enabled
host. Allowing us to provide a secure and extensible architecture for the
enablement of CNP transactions.
The procedures for establishing an e-EMV card on a TPM-enabled plat-
form comprise of a two-stage process consisting of an account activation, and
an application delivery stage. The process of emulating standard SDA/DDA/CDA
compliant cards necessitates a key generation procedure as the requisite keys
need to be generated local to a particular TPM. Keys generated external to
a TPM fail to fall directly under the purview of the protection mechanisms
provided by a Trusted Platform.
In describing this architecture we are making the following important
assumptions, as reiterated from Section 2. We assume the presence of a PKI,
much like the one the currently exists for EMV. That TPM-enabled platforms
are ubiquitous within the merchant/customer domain, and additionally that
both processor and operating system support are available to all platforms
within this domain. Furthermore, we make the underlying assumption that
an card issuer has extended credit or debit facilities to a particular customer.
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Figure 2: Architecture for Enrollment.
6.1 Enrollment
Enrollment in the e-EMV architecture is the act whereby a customer formally
registers as a legitimate cardholder and obtains an e-EMV card within the
system. Much like enrollment in the traditional EMV architecture, a card
issuer within the system is responsible for enrolling cardholders as well as
later authenticating their transactions (and possibly the cardholders them-
selves) via their supplied credentials. Acquirers can be seen to provide similar
functionality to their merchant customers.
The procedures for establishing an e-EMV card on a TPM-enabled plat-
form are as follows:
1. Account Activation:
The first stage, or the account activation stage, is the process through
which a customer becomes a member of a card issuer controlled group.
In this case, group membership is indicative of a customer activating
their account within the system (Figure 2, Step 1a). In the context
of Trusted Computing, this means becoming a member of a DAA (Di-
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rect Anonymous Attestation) or Privacy CA group (see Section 5.1.4).
This is achieved by demonstrating the presence of some non-migratable
TPM-controlled secret over which certification is requested, either an
AIK in the case of the Privacy CA or a secret value f for DAA.
At this point, the actual mapping between the customer and their plat-
form can be accomplished through a mechanism of the issuer’s choos-
ing. Such as, the customer providing information supplied to them
in the pre-enrolment stage (in which the card issuer agreed to extend
debit/credit facilities) communicated over a secure channel. In addi-
tion to this authentication information a platform will send various
credentials (see Section 5.1.6) as well as evidence as to the existence
of a non-migratable TPM-controlled secret. After reception of this in-
formation, the card issuer performs due diligence in satisfying itself as
to the relationship between a customer and their platform. This is
achieved through a reconciliation of the provided authentication infor-
mation with an examination of evidence supporting the existence of a
TPM-controlled secret. If the card issuer is satisfied as to this bind-
ing, the customer’s platform will receive certification on their TPM-
controlled secret. This certification will later be used to demonstrate
membership of a particular card scheme.
2. Secure Application Delivery:
Sometime after the first stage is complete, the customer downloads a
small secure application bundle (See Section 7.2) that provides acts as
a guide through the process of creating/installing the requisite TPM
managed keys. This bundle, once installed will enable a platform to
perform electronic transactions (Figure 2, Steps 2a and 2b). In addition
to interfacing with the TPM to provide a key-generation facility for the
creation of AC keys, the application itself has the dual role of acting as a
user-interface, fulfilling the application requirements of a typical EMV
card-resident application. The application will also provide some of
the functionality typically seen in POS terminals, particularly when it
comes to cardholder verification, as we shall see Section 8. At this point
it is important to note that the program used to guide the customer
through this process (in both stages 2a and 2b) is not necessarily a
stand-alone piece of software: it could very well be an applet or browser
plug-in.
Enrollment for the merchant (Figure 2, Step 1b), by contrast, is a function
of satisfying the requirements for payment processing as laid down by their
acquirer’s MOG. During the merchant enrollment procedure the merchant’s
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Figure 3: Architecture for TPM assisted EMV payments.
acquirer also becomes a certificate issuer, in the context of the Privacy CA
or DAA models. Here the merchant will need to install a plug-in, similar in
applicability to a 3-D Secure Merchant plug-in [6] but capable of emulating
certain EMV terminal functionality. The most important of which will be the
authentication of customer supplied credentials. Much like terminals in the
physical setting, merchants will require card issuer’s public key certificates
in order to verify customer transactions.
6.2 Transaction Architecture
After the enrollment procedure is complete, the e-EMV cardholder is now
ready to purchase goods at any participating TPM-enabled merchant. The
semantics of trust enforced by Trusted Computing functionality enables both
parties, the merchant and the customer, to obtain certain guarantees that
where hitherto unrealizable in past proposals. They can now be sure as to the
integrity of their communication peer’s platform. That each peer will behave
in the expected manner, in this case, adhere to, and faithfully adduce state
characteristics corresponding to legitimate transaction states. It is important
to point out that we do not expect the customer to be able to recognise or
validate software states within the system. This function can be fulfilled by
the application software itself and simply reported to the customer in a way
that is understandable.
The basic flow for transaction processing follows the message flows pre-
sented in Figure 3:
• Step 1 - Represents the browsing phase in which a customer browses a
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particular merchant site. During this step, the customer verifies that
the merchant is a member of a valid group of merchants corresponding
to a particular DAA/Privacy CA issuer (acquirer). Additioanlly, the
customer may verify that the merchant is in a state that exemplifies
an adequate policy for addressing privacy and confidentially concerns.
For example, conformance with Visa and Mastercard’s joint Payment
Card Industry [40] (PCI) data security standard.
• Step 2 - Represents the typical EMV ICC terminal interaction except
that the communication channel is now over the Internet.
• Step 2a - Represents the creation of an AC. As part of this phase
the customer’s platform generates a signature over its AC (using the
non-migratable TPM-controlled secret established during the account
activation phase) as well as the PCR values that provide evidence as to
the platform’s current state at the time of transaction authorisation.
• Steps 3 to 7 - Represents the decision to go on-line. As a result of
either terminal or card risk management procedures, the application
cryptogram (possibly in conjunction with the information adducing the
current platform state) is forwarded to the customer’s card issuer. After
examining the received data, the card issuer returns an AC of its own.
This AC informs both the card and the merchant as to whether the
request is to be approved or declined, in which case the card application
will either proceed with the transaction or reject it. It is important to
note here that it is optional for an card issuer to examine a customer’s
platform state as part of their decision making process. Indeed the
Tag Length Value (TLV) encoding mechanism used in EMV makes
it very easy for an card issuer to ignore any extraneous information
from a transaction referral request. Significantly, if the card issuer
does decide to take a customer’s platform state into consideration, the
bank itself would not need any Trusted Computing facility to examine
these characteristics. It would only need to be capable of hashing some
supplied records and verifying a signature (as we shall see in Section
7). Indeed this functionality could be provided by a third party facility
or could very well be preformed by the acquiring host.
7 Installing and Instantiating an e-EMV card
This section explains in detail the procedures and processes involved in es-
tablishing an e-EMV card within a TPM-enabled host.
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7.1 Account Activation
The account activation process for of an e-EMV card comes as a result
of TPM-enabled platform becoming a member of an card issuer controlled
group. This process is mirrored for the merchant server account activation
procedure with respect to a merchant’s acquirer. In both cases, account acti-
vation is achieved by successfully obtaining/generating a credential issued for
an AIK public key. This credential could be in the form of X.509 certificate
issued by a Privacy CA or it could be as a result of a platform performing a
DAA Sign operation on a public AIK component (see Section 5.1.4). In either
case the end result is similar. The customer will have their account activated,
later allowing them to demonstrate physical/logical possession of an active
card within the system. Through the establishment of customer-centric cre-
dentials embedded within a platform, the customer will be able to attest to
the existence of a key capable of replicating EMV’s SDA/DDA/CDA key
functionality. Here simulating SDA/DDA/CDA is dependant on the card
issuer offering Privacy CA or DAA services to its customers.
As part of account activation there is an additional requirement for a
customer to obtain an ICC Public Key Certificate. Within the EMV spec-
ifications, the ICC Public Key Certificate holds a particular meaning as it
contains a slew of vital information, most notable of which is the Application
PAN and cardholder name. What follows is two different approaches for a
customer to obtain this ICC PK Certificate.
7.1.1 Privacy CA Approach
The Privacy CA approach is used to obtain a credential from a card issuer
which will later be used to validate signed platform metrics demonstrating
both possession, and correct usage of, a valid e-EMV card.
This process involves the generation of an AIK IC key pair (SIC and PIC
for the private/public portions respectively) and having the public portion
incorporated into an ICC PK Certificate. The process involved in the gener-
ation of a new ICC key within a platform maps to the generation of an AIK
key within a TPM. That is, as a result of performing the TPM MakeIdentity
command [26, pp.147] which results in the creation a new AIK under the con-
trol of the SRK. The PIC portion, various platform credentials as well and
customer authentication data is encrypted with the issuing hosts public key
(see Section 2) and sent to the Privacy CA. If after authenticating a partic-
ular customer and satisfying itself that the request is coming from a genuine
TPM, the Privacy CA will issue an ICC PK Certificate (AIK credential) to
the customer’s platform.
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This credential can then be used to provide evidence of card activation
within the system. Additionally the ICC PK Certificate could be further
enhanced through X.509 v3 extensions. In this regard, it is possible to add
key and policy information to the credential, such as setting a private key
usage period under which the AIK signing key will operate.
7.1.2 DAA Approach
The DAA enrollment procedure occurs exactly as laid out in Section 5.1.4.
However, here the DAA issuer is instantiated by an card issuer controlled
issuing host. Pursuant to a successful completion of the DAA join proce-
dure, the customer will be able to demonstrate that their account has been
activated with respect to a particular card issuer.
It is important to note here that the usage of ζ in the DAA signing
process confers certain anonymity properties to a customer. If the value of
ζ is changed for every transaction a customer instigates then they can prove
they were issued a valid credential yet remain anonymous in the signing
and verification procedure. In itself this property doesn’t hold much value in
traditional CNP style transactions as typically the customer provides copious
identifying information. Its real advantage comes in enabling future (possibly
anonymous) P2P commerce and in the provision of digital goods, as well as
allowing a delineation between browsing and ordering phases.
Subsequent to a successful completion of either the DAA join procedure or
upon receipt of a credential from a Privacy CA, the card issuer activates the
customer’s account within their systems. This then enables the soon to be
downloaded e-EMV application to be used in ensuing financial transactions.
There is one issue, however, that pervades both the Privacy CA and DAA
approaches. That is, the use of an EK in platform authentication. It remains
unclear how much meaning an EK would have to an card issuer or acquirer
as neither would typically have any interaction with platform manufacturers.
However, there is no reason why a separate non-migratable TPM key pair
couldn’t be used. This key can be sent with customer authentication details
to the issuing host in the same way as an AIK public key is sent in the
Privacy CA approach. The important part here, isn’t so much that a request
is coming from a particular TPM, it’s that the request is coming from a
particular customer. We observe customer authentication in-and-of itself
isn’t necessarily a trivial task. We assume some sort of proof of knowledge
examination, for example, knowledge of a shared secret created in the pre-
enrollment stage. However, the actual mechanism used is orthogonal to the
discussion.
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7.2 Secure Application Delivery
The delivery of the combined set-up and interface utility to a customer’s
platform is an interactive process between a customer and their card issuer.
The delivery of the program itself necessitates a number of checks to ensure
the binding between a customer and their platform. This is because the
set-up utility requires the inclusion of a unique ICC Master Key per card
issuance and hence cannot be generated by the platform itself (see Section
4.2.2). Instead the ICC Master Key needs to be injected into the platform as
part of the application delivery process. In addition to the secure delivery of
the application, there is an underlying customer-driven requirement to ensure
the authenticity and the “behaviour” of the application once delivered.
The dual concerns of authenticity and “behavior” can typically be ad-
dressed using what is termed a validation credential in the Trusted Comput-
ing literature (see Section 5.1.6. In this way runtime metrics can be compared
against known good values to assure customers that their application is per-
forming as intended.
The issue of secure delivery of an application using Trusted Computing
has previously been examined in the context of conditional access in mobile
systems [15, 16] as well as being alluded to in a number of the TCG’s pub-
lications, such as [19]. In our discussion, the delivery of an application to
a customer’s platform, as well as the corresponding requirement of securely
storing the application upon receipt, can be handled as follows:
These requirements are fulfilled by creating a Certified Migratable Key
(CMK) pair then “sealing” the application to the the customer’s TPM. Sealed
messages in the context of Trusted Computing are messages that are bound
to a set of platform metrics specified by the message sender and thus can
only be opened when the platform is in a certain state. This is normally
achieved with the TPM Seal [26, pp.54] or the TPM Sealx command [26,
pp.75]. However, the notion of sealing an application to a platform typically
has local significance only. We require the same functionality as provided
by the TPM Seal command yet slightly different semantics. The TPM Seal
command works by the verifier (card issuer) sending a TPM PCR INFO
[25, pp.68] structure to the remote platform (customer). However, as our
requirements dictate that the keys be migratable (in order to allow a customer
to port their card to another platform) the option of TPM Seal is no longer
viable. This is because the TPM specifications explicitly forbids the use of
non-migratable keys in sealing. Our requirements also differ in that the card
issuers be allowed to “seal” the data on their platform and send it to the
requesting customer’s remote platform.
The set-up phase of this can be illustrated programmatically as in Algo-
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rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Set-up Phase
1: IC Key := TPM CMK CreateKey (TPM Auth Always, digestAtCre-
ation, digestAtRelease, IssuingBankpubkey)
2: TPM Certify Info2 := TPM CertifyKey2(IC Key)
3: Signature := AIK/DAASign(Hash(TPM Keypubkey))
Here the customer creates a new certified migratable key specifying both
current and future platform states required for key retrieval, as well as spec-
ifying that the key will always require authorisation. Additionally the Mi-
gration Authority is set via the card issuer’s public key (See Appendix A for
a discussion of CMK migration).
The next step involves having the newly generated key certified by using
the TPM CertifyKey2 command (which is permissable as the key is a CMK)
and finally having a hash of the public part of this key signed using DAA4
or a Privacy CA certified key5 as outlined in Section 7.1. In this sense the
customer is effectively producing a signature over the public CMK using a
signature key that the card issuer knows to be bound to a particular customer.
In this setting IC Key can provide the same level of assurance as results
from the TPM Seal command. This is because during the generation of
the key both the “digestAtCreation” and “digestAtRelease” parameters are
fully specified. In this case the digestAtRelease is semantically equivalent to
sealing.
A more fully specified exchange protocol is as follows (here Rx is a ran-
dom number, IB is the card issuer and C is the customer):
1: IB → C : Rib ‖ IBpubkey ‖ [Platform Attestation]
2: C → IB : IBpubkey(TPM Certify Info2 ‖ IC Keypubkey ‖ Signature ‖ Rib
‖ Rc)
3: IB → C : Rc ‖ IC Keypubkey(application ‖ CertTPM Key)
1. In step 1 the card issuer sends a challenge and optionally its own plat-
form state to the customer in conjunction with its public key in its
certificate.
4DAA is capable of signing 160-bits of externally generated data or AIK keys depending
on the status of a 1-bit flag
5AIK keys themselves are incapable of signing the hash result directly, instead the
signature would be as a result of incorporating the hash as measured data in a PCR
register.
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Figure 4: e-EMV Trusted Platform resident application
2. In step 2 the customer verifies this platform state (if present) as well
as the public key certificate. If all goes well, the customer returns the
public portion of the key it generated during the set-up phase along
with the requisite information specifying the control policy for the pri-
vate portion of the key. In addition to this it sends its own signed
platform metrics.
3. In step 3, the verifier examines the received data. If the storage seman-
tics for the private key match its own security policy then it sends the
application (with embedded ICC Master Key) to the customer.
The final phase of the protocol for secure storage is application retrieval.
The basic algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 2 Message Retrieval






Providing that the current platform state matches the requirements for
the “sealed” data and the incoming authorisation data matches the authori-
sation data set for the private key during the set-up phase, then unseal the
data. If neither of these two conditions are met then the message should
remain sealed until both conditions can be fulfilled.
Ensuant from a successful delivery of the e-EMV set-up bundle (Figure
4), the customer is now capable of utilising their SDA/DDA/CDA compliant
card on their TPM-enabled platform.
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Figure 5: e-EMV Customer - Merchant Interface
8 e-EMV in Operation
Transaction processing in e-EMV follows the EMVmessage flows from section
4.1 and are illustrated in Figure 5. The following provides a detailed mapping
of the EMV transaction architecture as applied to e-EMV.
8.1 Customer - Merchant Interaction
Customer to Merchant interaction in the virtual environment mirrors trans-
action processing at POS terminals in which the transaction flows of an EMV
transaction can be mapped to an e-EMV transaction as follows:
1. Application Selection: Typically, application selection occurs in re-
sponse to a terminal initiated command to select the appropriate EMV
application from a multi-application card. In this case we assume a
single application instance in which customer/merchant application
matching is dependent on finding a suitable AID. The AID in this case
can be either a set of validation credentials supported by the platform
or a reported set of one or more PCR values in the form of a platform
attestation, representing a valid application execution.
2. Initiate Application Processing: Following on from the above, the
customer’s application commences application processing. In the phys-
ical world this would yield a response in which the card returns its ap-
plication interchange profile and its application file locator. However,
in this setting as the cards are virtualised and free from the constraints
of typical ICC cards, all e-EMV cards would represent DDA/CDA ca-
pabilities. Additionally, as part of this step the merchant terminal
plug-in provides to the e-EMV application any terminal-related infor-
mation pertaining to the business environment at the point of service.
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An example of such information would be terminal capabilities or the
country in which the terminal is operating.
3. Read Application Data: The steps involved in issuing one or more
READ RECORD commands in this setting is relatively redundant as
we assume the application is executing solely in main memory on a
customer’s platform.
4. Processing Restrictions: This mandatory step is performed by the
merchant and doesn’t require any direct interaction with the customer’s
execution environment. This step is primarily concerned with judging
the compatibility of the e-EMV application with that of the terminal
application. This process can be handled in an e-EMV environment
through a process of reconciliation between terminal supported appli-
cations and customer supplied validation credentials/platform attesta-
tion.
5. Off-line Data Authentication: This step, corresponding to a POS
terminal issuance of an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is
achieved through the TPM’s Attestation mechanism. The three options
for off-line data authentication available in EMV-compliant cards are:
SDA, DDA and CDA.
(a) SDA - SDA is relatively simple process whereby a validation cre-
dential could be generated (by an card issuer) providing metrics
for a correctly functioning e-EMV card application. These metrics
can then be compared against the runtime PCR metrics reported
in an attestation challenge to a merchant. An outline of this pro-
cess is as follows:
i. An merchant server requests one or more PCR values cor-
responding to the PCRs to which the e-EMV application is
bound. In addition to this request the merchant attests its
own platform metrics for digestion by the customer’s plat-
form.
ii. The customer’s platform examines the attested metrics and
determines the suitability of the merchant for adherence to
certain desirable policies, such as the PCI standards for card
processing. If satisfied, a customer’s platform agent culls the
SML for the events responsible for generating the requested
PCR values.
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iii. The TPM loads the AIK/DAA signing key using a customer
provided password. This loaded key then signs the requested
registers using an AIK. This will either be the same AIK for
which a certificate was obtained during the e-EMV account
activation stage (as per the Privacy CA model) or a new AIK
over which a DAA signature will be generated.
iv. The platform agent then obtains various credentials (the plat-
form credential, the conformance credential, attestation iden-
tity credential, validation credentials) that vouch for the TPM.
These credentials, along with the relevant portion of the SML
and the requested signed PCR values are returned to the mer-
chant server for verification.
v. The merchant then examines the credentials, checks signa-
tures6 and compares a hash of the SML entries to the attested
PCR values. If they match the verifier can be sure as to the
current state of the customer’s platform. In effect achieving
SDA.
(b) DDA - DDA by contrast requires a slight modification to the SDA
mechanism as outlined in step 5(a)iii of the above. During the op-
eration of TPM Quote in which the PCR registers are signed, the
customer incorporates a merchant supplied 160-bit challenge to
the attestation. This challenge takes the place of the operand ex-
ternalData which is of type TPM NONCE in the PCR attestation
process.
(c) CDA - CDA consists of an e-EMV generated dynamic signature
(similar to DDA but includes an AC generation) followed by veri-
fication of this signature by the merchant. In the EMV POS envi-
ronment this would consist of a ICC private key signature over the
Signed Dynamic Application Data of which a TC or ARQC and an
unpredictable number (as per DDA) are integral parts. Incorpo-
rating this into a Trusted Platform environment isn’t necessarily
any more complicated than either the SDA or DDA approaches.
All that is required is having the e-EMV application incorporate
AC generation as measured data within the system. That way, the
generation of an AC, along with its data output (TC/ARQC) can
be integrated into a PCR register. The actual examinable out-
6There may be a situation in which a merchant is unfamiliar with certificate authority
espoused in ICC public key certificate. However, provided each card issuer is itself a link
in a chain traversing back to globally recognised root CA, for example Visa or Mastercard,
then this verification can be as a result of certificate chain traversal
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put, that is the TC or ARCQ, is then correspondingly appended
to the SML and a signature is generated over the representative
PCR values. In this way the merchant, upon receipt of the at-
testation bundle can examine the SML for the inclusion of an AC
and verify its veracity through a simple SHA-1 hash and signature
comparison.
6. Card holder Verification: In the typical POS EMV operation, this
step allows the terminal to verify the authenticity of a cardholder. This
authentication is based on the card and terminal both supporting a par-
ticular CVM. In addition to a CVM verifying a customer, some CMVs,
particularly PIN authentication, are used as a means of authorising a
transaction.
Through the use of Trusted Computing functionality we can make PIN
authentication and authorisation implicit within a platform. This is
achieved through the TPM key authorisation mechanism whereby cer-
tain keys require 20 bytes of authorisation data to be supplied prior to
being loaded. In the architecture presented so far, we have instances
of two different key types, Attestation Identity Keys and Certifiable
Migratable Keys. Both of these require authorisation, in the form of
TPM AUTHDATA, to be securely communicated to a TPM. In our
architecture, this authentication data will be communicated over a se-
cure Object-Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP) session [24,
pp.62]. The use of an OIAP session allows authorisation information
to be sent TPM without revealing the data on the channel over which
it is sent. This in effect is an adjunct to the assumption of a Trusted
Path provided by the OS in Section 5.5.
The ability to actually use a key as part of a transaction demonstrates
to a merchant that a CVM method has occurred successfully. In the
case of the CMK, to actually load the e-EMV application, and in the
case of the AIK/DAA key to sign platform metrics. By verifying the
state of the platform, a merchant can be assured that only a valid
customer would be capable of using the AIK/DAA key generated in
the account activation stage.
7. Terminal Risk Management and Action Analysis: The purpose
of of terminal risk management and terminal action analysis is to pro-
tect the issuer, acquirer and payment system from fraud. The variety
of measures used in terminal risk management, such as floor limits, ran-
dom transaction selection and velocity checking would remain largely
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unaffected in the transition to an e-EMV payment architecture. All
such services would be replicated in the merchant terminal plug-in.
8. Card Risk Management and Action Analysis: Details of card
risk management are proprietary to card issuers and are outside the
scope of the EMV specification and as such would remain proprietary
to individual card issuers within this system.
9. On-line Authorisation: During normal transaction processing the
merchant terminal may decide to proceed with an on-line check, this
again remains unaffected in an e-EMV environment.
10. Issuer Script Processing: Issuer Script processing is perhaps the
most difficult EMV feature to replicate in an e-EMV setting. It would
be impossible for an card issuer to force an update on a customer’s
platform without gaining their consent. This remains an open issue in
an e-EMV environment.
8.2 Application Cryptograms
As we saw from Section 4.2.2 application cryptograms are generated by an
ICC using the session keys derived from the ICC Master Key. These session
keys are then used to protect transaction messages. In our architecture, in
conjunction with the information typically sent in the AC message, the e-
EMV application appends the current platform state as witnessed by their
issuer validated signing key. After examining the AC message as well as
the supplied state the verifier, be they merchant or card issuer, can make a
decision as to whether or not to proceed with a transaction. In the instance
where an AC is an ARQC, as mentioned in Section 6.2, the TLV encoding
scheme used in EMV allows the issuer to ignore extraneous information if
they so choose. The card issuer can then respond with an ARPC indicating
whether the transaction should be approved or declined, in which case a TC
or an AAC will be generated by the customer’s platform.
As we have seen in Section 4.2.2, an important aspect in the generation
of ACs is the use of the ATC as diversification data. Trusted Computing can
be used to model the ATC using monotonic counters [24, pp.80]. Monotonic
counters provide an ever-increasing incremental value which can provide the
exact same functionality as described for EMV’s ATC. For every transaction
that is initiated by a customer, their TPM can increment a monotonic counter
associated with their e-EMV card. Indeed we can model any additional EMV
counters using this Trusted Computing facility.
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9 An Application of Trusted Computing to
CNP transactions
9.1 Pseudonymous Credit Cards
Pseudonymous credit cards are an interesting corollary to the DAA account
activation process as highlighted in section 7.1, and can be seen as supple-
menting the ideas presented in [7]. In this respect we aim to replace PAN
account information with a representative pseudonym, both in the context
of authenticating as a valid member of an card issuer controlled group and
in producing a payment token in the form of an EMV TC.
As mentioned previously, by itself this pseudonymous property doesn’t
hold much value in traditional CNP transactions, as often the customer pro-
vides ample identifying information. However, we can gain some traction in
helping enabling pseudonymous P2P commerce, particularly in the provision
of digital goods as well as allowing a possible delineation between browsing
and ordering phases of a transaction.
During the registration procedure the platform must reveal a pseudonym
NI of the form ζ
f
I . Here the quantity ζ
f
I is set by the customer’s card issuer
and allows them to associate a “handle” with a customer as well as to check
for rogue platforms during payment resolution. This pseudonym, NI , can
be used in the derivation of the ICC Master Key — instead of using a PAN
as specified in Annex A1.4 of [12]. In this way a customer can convince a
merchant that they are indeed in possession of a valid card through a zero
knowledge proof, but without revealing a particular account number which
could be linked to subsequent transactions. In this way we can provide
anonymity through unlinkability. This can further be delineated between
unlinkability between the browsing and ordering phases, where a customer
may insist on choosing random base names (ζ) during their browsing and
ordering phases, or even use a fixed base name in the form of a derivation
of a merchant’s name raised to their secret f . In this way a customer is
linkable to a single merchant but not across various merchant stores. This is
advantageous in the situations where customers can gain loyalty bonuses for
continued patronage of a merchant site.
When it comes to generating a transaction certificate to complete a par-
ticular payment, the customer can do so as normal, as the ICC Master key
used in the generation of an AC is a diversification of the customer’s handle
with their card issuer. This combined with a DAA signature covering the TC
and current platform metrics can uniquely identify a particular customer, but
only to the bank to which they belong. Additionally, as the recommended
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minimum set of data elements for AC generation, as laid out in Table 25
of [12] details no mention of uniquely identifying information, the merchant
details can remain separate to a payment request. Thus achieving a result
similar to that of the delineation of OI and PI in a SET environment.
10 Conclusions
The proliferation of the Internet as an avenue for electronic commerce, in
the form of CNP transactions, has seen something of a popular explosion in
recent years. However, with this explosion has come a number of issues, most
notable of which is the high level of transaction chargebacks (several times
the system average) seen in CNP transaction. The level of fraud, whilst not
yet reaching endemic proportions, has raised significant concern amongst the
card processing community. This has led to a number of proposals being put
forward to try and address this problem.
As we saw from Section 3, these proposals fail to address certain key
issues in securing on-line CNP transactions. There is no way of ascertaining
if the customer presenting a particular card (typically in the form of a PAN)
is in possession of the card at time of purchase or indeed if they are the valid
owner of the card. Of the proposals presented, only SSL has enjoyed any real
quantifiable success, and from our analysis, is actually the weakest in terms
of authenticating customers prior to transaction processing.
This report proposed a new security architecture for securing CNP trans-
actions. By creating software based EMV cards running on Trusted Plat-
forms we replicate many of the features of standard EMV-compliant cards
for use in CNP transactions. Through the account activation procedure out-
lined in Section 7.1 we established how we can remotely demonstrate pos-
session of a card within our system. We showed how card ownership can
be demonstrated through the use of an OIAP session. We also showed how
EMV transaction messages can be mapped to e-EMV transaction messages.
In this regard, we demonstrated how EMV keys can be generated and bound
to a particular TPM-enabled platform. We also showed how an e-EMV card
can be ported from one TPM-enabled platform to another.
In this respect we can achieve a significant improvement in the level of
security afforded in both initiating, completing and processing CNP transac-
tions. Indeed, the e-EMV infrastructure presented could be used as a basis
for establishing both fungible and non-fungible payments. It is not necessar-
ily restricted to card payments although this was the basis for this research.
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11 Appendices
A CMK Generation and e-EMV Migration
Migration in the context of Trusted Computing is the process through which
a migratable key moves from one TCG-compliant platform to another. This
allows the new platform to function exactly as the old one with respect to
key usage. The TPM CMK CreateKey command [26, pp.93] is responsible
for the generation a new certified migratable key within a platform. This
command takes as input the public key of an Migration Selection Authority
(MSA), in this case the card issuer.
When it comes to the actual migration of a CMK a number of entities may
be involved in the migration, foremost of which are the MSA and possibly
a Migration Authority (MA), both of which are assumed to be under the
control of the card issuer in this particular scenario. In this setting the
MSA controls the migration whilst the MA handles the migrated key. The
actual migration of a CMK is as a result of calling TPM CMK CreateBlob
[26, pp.99] and requires the authorisation of the MSA as well as that of the
TPM Owner (customer).
This process begins with the creation of an owner authorised TPM MIGRATIONKEYAUTH
structure [25, pp.36] using TPM AuthorizeMigrationKey command [26, pp.85].
Inherent in this structure are the destination migrationKey, the migrationScheme
(which must be set to TPM MS RESTRICT APPROVE or TPM MS RESTRICT APPROVE DOUBLE)
and a digest of tpmProof. The approval of an MA to agree to facilitate the mi-
gration of the key comes in the form of a signature over a TPM CMK AUTH
structure [25, pp.40]. This structure contains the digest of the MA public
key, the digest of the destination public key and a digest of the public por-
tion of the key to be migrated. Finally, the TPM Owner authorises the
MA’s approval using TPM CMK CreateTicket [26, pp.97] and generates a
signature ticket. This signature ticket is then passed, along with the TPM
Owner’s authorisation, the MA’s authorisation and the MSA’s approval to
the TPM CMK CreateBlob command [26, pp.99] allowing the key to be mi-
grated to another platform.
In this way the the wrapped e-EMV application and the CMK which
wraps it can be ported from one TPM-enabled platform to another TPM-
enabled platform of the customers choosing. This occurs with one important
caveat, the migration itself is a strictly controlled process requiring both cus-
tomer and card issuer authorisation. In this way a card can not be extracted
from a platform without explicate customer consent. After migration of the
CMK and the application, the customer would re-run the account activation
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stage in order to establish the card within the new platform. This is a nec-
essary step as neither an AIK nor a DAA value f are migratable structures.
The card issuer would then update its system to reflect a new card being
linked to an existing customer PAN, much in the same way as secondary
cards are linked to primary account numbers.
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